Zuola Inbox
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Understand Address, Understand Hidden Clues Behind the Envelope

Email Basics
Safety Guidelines.

Inbox displays the sender and body of the message, just a part of the email. The full original code may also include delivery path, time, address, device, and association with conversations. Understand these details before deciding how to share.

Choose EML/TXT, Test Email Parser →

1. Email Address: Display Name Does Not Equal Real Address

For Example 新聞編輯 <[email protected]>:News EditorDisplay Name, True Address is [email protected]。@ Left side is for the account part interpreted by the email service provider, right side is for the domain. Just looking at the name, profile picture, or domain doesn't confirm the sender's real identity.

Standard Reference:RFC 5321: Addresses and emails、RFC 5322: Addresses and display names。

2. Understand the Domain First, Then Verify the Other Party's Identity

If the sender claims to be a company or institution personnel, you can forward the email The full domain after @Use as a verification clue by cross-referencing with known official websites, institutional directories, and other independent sources. Do not rely solely on display names or links within the email.

For example, address is [email protected],you can manually check example.com the site; some organizations only set www.example.com,may need to add www. See website. If address is [email protected],or may also be from verified example.com Inbox Instructions: Manage Tags. Do Not Delete Tags After Removing Them; Consider Another Website as a Verified Owner.

Disposal principle: If the sender claims to be from an institution but cannot be found on the website, or if the website content does not match the claimed identity, you should be more alert and independently verify.But only email services, internal subdomains, website faults, or using a different brand website could also be normal situations; the absence of a website cannot prove fraud alone. Having a website, HTTPS, or normal email verification cannot prove trust alone.

Read from right to left: top-level, second-level, third-level, fourth-level domains

Using www.news.example.com For example, the root dot ``.`` is usually omitted:

LevelExamplesHow to understand
Top-level domain (TLD)comRightmost tag; may also be org, tw, etc.
Second-level domainexample.comIn com left side bar add one more layer example.
Third-level domainnews.example.comAdd a news subdomain to example.com.
4th Level Domainwww.news.example.comTry adding www. It is a common host or subdomain name, not a mark of trust.

Level Does Not Equal "Registrable Domain": For Example example.com.tw has tw at the top level, com.tw at the second level, and example.com.tw at the third level. A public suffix may contain more than one label, so looking at only the final two labels is not always sufficient.amazon.com.login.attacker.example attacker.example is a subdomain of attacker.example, not of amazon.com; brand names appearing in the URL prefix do not necessarily mean it is controlled by the brand.

Homograph Attack: Looks the same, but is actually different characters

Normal amazon.com If you replace the first Latin letter 'a' (U+0061) with the Cyrillic lowercase 'а' (U+0430), it will become аmazon.com,its ASCII/Punycode form is xn--mazon-3ve.comIt's Not amazon.com. This Is Only for Identification and Not to Claim that the Amazon Website Has Been Compromised.

Display Text (Do Not Connect)Actual Difference
www.zuola.comThe final a is the Latin letter U+0061.
www.zuolа.comThe final а is the Cyrillic letter U+0430. Its equivalent Punycode form is www.xn--zuol-83d.com, a different domain from the one above.

Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) itself has legitimate uses, not equal to fraud; the risk comes from exploiting similar-looking characters to confuse identities. Different browsers, fonts, and security strategies may display Unicode or xn-- Opening Punycode in the address bar cannot be assumed to look the same or trigger a warning.

Verify the full domain in ASCII form, pay attention to non-ASCII characters, and confirm contact information from a known official entry. Do not enter credentials, download, or accept notifications to verify suspicious domains; all examples of suspicious domains on this page are intentionally kept in plain text without clickable links.

Reference:ICANN: IDN and Punycode、ICANN: Identical Domains and Impersonation RisksThis is a common sense verification, not a real-time security or holder judgment for a sample domain.

3. What Are the Differences Between Recipient, Cc, and Bcc?

FieldsPurposeWhat do other recipients typically see?
SenderThe main recipient or processor of this email.All To, Cc lists; usually no Bcc list.
CcNotify relevant personnel, but this does not automatically mean a reply is required.Like To, you can see To and Cc; the addresses will be visible to other recipients.
BccSend a copy, typically not shared with other recipients.Generally, you can still see the To and Cc; whether other Bcc recipients are visible depends on the sending method and the headers left behind, and cannot be guaranteed in all cases.

Bcc is a Hidden Recipient List, Not Encryption or Anonymity Function.Sender, Mail Service Providers, and Delivery Systems may still know the actual delivery address. Clicking "Reply All" may expose the sender's own address.

Email has two layers of information: To/Cc on the letterVisible headers, and the one used for SMTP deliveryActual Delivery EnvelopeThey May Not Be the Same, So You Can't Judge Who Received the Email by Only Looking at the 'To' Field.

Bcc field may be removed, left empty, or retain partial addresses in specific copies. Backup from the sender, forwarded copies,Delivered-To Recipient clues may remain in headers.No Bcc field does not mean no blind-sending; the parser cannot restore the list of retained items.

Standard Reference:RFC 5322: Handling of destination addresses and Bcc。

4. What Information Might the Email Header Reveal?

Original Email is usually listed first 欄位名稱: 內容 The Header, Followed by a Blank Line, Is the Body or MIME Section. Very Long Headers Can Be Folded into Multiple Lines; Attachments Can Also Be Directly Included in the Source Code..eml Usually, we save the complete email..txt They may only contain a copied header, or they may include the entire letter.

Headers/SegmentsThey may reveal clues.Read Limits
From、Sender、Reply-To、Return-PathSender Address, Proxy Sender, Reply To Address, Return Receipt Address, and Forwarding Service.Each field has a different purpose; inconsistent addresses may be normal forwarding, or they may need verification; the From field can be forged.
To、Cc、Bcc、Delivered-To、X-Original-ToPublic recipient list, actual recipient address, aliases, or forwarding relationships.Not a complete delivery record; missing fields can’t exclude other recipients.
Received、X-Originating-IP、X-ReceivedEmail Server Name, IP, Internal Host Name, Delivery Time, and Routing Path.IP may belong to a service provider, relay, VPN, or shared exit, not necessarily the sender's device, and cannot be used as an address directly.
Date and Timezone in ReceivedSending Time Claims, Arrival Times at Each Station, Possible Time Zones, and Activity Times.Date may be set by the sender; forwarding, delay, and clock drift affect the inference.
Message-ID、In-Reply-To、ReferencesMail ID, conversation linkage, may link different people's copies.Not a login credential; it can’t confirm a real person’s identity alone.
X-Mailer, User-Agent, Organization, or Other X-HeadersEmail software, versions, organization names and provider-specific information.Not every message has it; it could be deleted or forged.
Authentication-Results、Received-SPF、DKIM-SignatureService Provider Validation Results, Sending Domain, Signing Domain, and Signing Indentification.The text in EML can be forged. Only the results added by the receiving service provider within the trust boundary can be trusted; 'read as pass' does not mean the local re-verification is successful.
Subject, MIME body, HTML, attachment names, and contentSubject, signature file, historical references, and forwarding data in attachments; links and tracking pixels may contain individual identifiers.Load remote image or click link may expose opening behavior. Base64 is encoding, not encryption.

Received is typically sent by each receiving serverTopAdd New Hijack, newest at the top, older below; but attackers can also pre-populate with fake old headers. You should first confirm the one added by your trusted inbox system, then read the rest of the path.

When no network queries and a trustworthy delivery background are available, the local tool canDecoding Fields and Claims, cannot confirm the SPF, DKIM, and DMARC status as genuine or historical, nor can it prove the sender's identity.

Standard Reference:No Mail、Delivery Tracking、Trust Boundary of Authentication-Results。

Safe Check Before Sharing Emails

  1. Keep original emails untouched as evidence; create a separate copy for sharing when needed. Modifying headers or body text may invalidate the signature.
  2. Check the recipient, CC, reply, and bounce addresses, as well as the headers, IP, hostname, time, conversation identifier, signature file, and history references.
  3. Don’t automatically load remote images, open HTML, execute attachments, or click on unknown links. Only check headers; no need to parse or display attachments.
  4. Be mindful that EML includes the entire email and attachments; only provide a header copy after thorough inspection when only the header is needed. Even providing only the header may reveal sensitive relationships.
  5. Enable multi-factor authentication for your email, check forwarding rules, and account recovery methods, and be cautious when authorizing third-party email programs.
  6. Encrypting the transmission does not mean only the sender and recipient can read it. Even if the body is encrypted, it cannot be assumed that all addresses, subject lines, and delivery information are hidden.

Click "More" menu to choose "Show original email" after opening email in Gmail web. Other providers can look for "View source/Full header/Export EML".View Gmail official documentationDo Not Post Sensitive Source Code to Third-Party Online Analysis Websites.

Need to share complete file when encrypt with age locally →

6. SPF, DKIM, DMARC: Three different checks

These three are the core mechanisms of email domain validation, all relying on DNS published information:SPF publishes sending authorization, DKIM uses digital signatures paired with DNS public keys, DMARC aligns validation results with the reader's From domain and publishes handling policies and reporting requirements.They can reduce the risk of domain spoofing and help the receiving system identify legitimate senders; however, they cannot guarantee that the email will be delivered to the inbox, nor are they content encryption.

MechanismEasy to Understand MetaphorsWhat Exactly Are You Checking For?No guarantees?
SPF:Sender Policy FrameworkDomain announcement "Who can deliver mail to this mailing address"?Inbox Server checks the DNS SPF authorization using the connected sender IP. The main check is on the SMTP envelope MAIL FROM domain; specific cases use HELO, not checking the From field directly on the interface.No signing the body; no verifying the real person. Normal forwarding could change the sending IP, causing SPF failure.
DKIM:DomainKeys Identified MailShipping system seals specified content with verifiable digital seals.Mail System signs the selected header and body with its private key; the receiving system retrieves the public key for validation by querying the DNS based on the d= domain and s= selector signed.Not encryption. The sender domain doesn’t have to equal From; it covers only the actual signing part. Changes to the forwarding list, expired signatures, or key changes can also affect verification.
DMARC:Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and ConformanceVerify if the 'Mail/Delivery' truly represents the domain of the sender, and inquire about the domain owner's preference for handling verification failures.Cored by visible 'From', at least one path must pass and be aligned: SPF passes and is aligned, or DKIM passes and is aligned. Alignment can be strict or according to organizational domain relationships.Both SPF and DKIM do not have to pass. These checks do not verify the display name, the sender's real identity, attachment safety or whether the content is well-intentioned.

Why are two passes still not necessarily trustworthy signatures?

Assuming the letter says From: 編輯 <[email protected]>,actually by [email protected] Send. Even though SPF for example.net passes, it doesn’t prove the sending system is authorized by example.com. If DKIM for example.com passes and aligns with the alignment rules, DMARC can pass; if all that passes are other non-aligned domains, DMARC may still fail.

Where in DNS is it placed?

SPF is typically a TXT record for the sending domain, with content like v=spf1 At the beginning; DKIM public keys are typically located at selector._domainkey.example.com;DMARC policy is typically located at _dmarc.example.com, using v=DMARC1 Opening. These are concept examples, not directly applicable DNS settings for our site.

DMARC's p=none This indicates a monitoring policy that does not require quarantining or rejecting based on DMARC failure;p=quarantine Isolation Suggestions, Such as Moving to Junk Emailp=reject Rejection is recommended. The receiving system makes the final decision according to its own policy and may also consider reputation, content and other security signals.

Why am I still receiving phishing, spoofed, or spam emails?

Early email formats allowed senders to fill in From, display names, and some headers. While service providers have done a lot to combat spam, phishing, and spoofing, verification can still encounter issues like legal forwarding, incomplete settings, and different system policies. Headers in the email copy may also be modified.

Attackers can also use their own approximate domain spellings to set up SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, or by sending through stolen legitimate accounts.Three out of three passed, only supporting domain validation for the corresponding domain, cannot guarantee the content is credible, the sender is not compromised, or the attachment is not malicious.Important requirements should still be confirmed through independent and trustworthy channels.

The machine parser only reads the email 'what is recorded', without re-checking DNS, obtaining the authorization data at the time of sending, confirming the boundary of trusted headers, or verifying the complete signature.There will be "Results Recorded in Mail" on the interface, no authentication or security score provided.

Standard and Background:SPF(RFC 7208)、DKIM(RFC 6376)、DMARC(RFC 9989)。

7. Try RAW Email Local Parser

You can now choose to view the sender/receiver relationships, time, delivery path, IP, authentication claims, and MIME content and attachments in natural sentences and table format. Emails, attachments, and results are stored only in the browser's memory and are not uploaded or included in any analysis.

Test Email Parser

Parser does not render email HTML, does not load remote images, does not open URLs or attachments, does not query external DNS/IP, and does not recursively scan embedded emails.